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1. Executive Summary
From its inspired beginnings in 2001, the Sudan Landmines Information and Response
Initiative (SLIRI) has had the potential to become an influential mine action organization
with the capacity to use the mine action platform for engaging Sudan’s adversaries in a
peacebuilding dialogue. It is the only non-partisan indigenous organization in the
country. Its first location – or Sector Operations Centre (SOC) as the site offices have
been called - and the most innovative has been in the Nuba Mountains, where shortly
after the cease-fire in January 2002 SLIRI first introduced two offices working in tandem
on either side of the conflict line for collecting information about victims and mined
areas. Information was collected by pairs of field workers drawn from both sides of the
conflict. From the Nuba Mountains, SLIRI expanded, establishing 15 Sector Operation
Centres (SOCs) throughout the country as the programme grew, operating simultaneously
in Government controlled areas and SPLM controlled areas. Its ultimate ambition was to
have SOCs in all major areas of the country with sub-sector locations where basic
landmine surveys would contribute to protecting the population and to assisting mine
clearance in setting priorities.
Unlike the other national NGOs dedicated to mine action SLIRI has actively avoided
affiliation with either side of the conflict. The Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines
(SCBL) and Sudan Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR) both operate under
the authority of the Government. Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) operates under
the authority of the SPLM. But SLIRI, by its original conception and by conviction, has
remained politically non-aligned. This has facilitated its work on both sides of the
conflict line, in Government-controlled and SPLM-controlled areas, and neutrality has
been an asset.
Neutrality has had its price. In order to accomplish its ultimate objective of becoming a
legitimate nationwide organization with some permanence, SLIRI needed to become a
full-fledged NGO and be recognized as such by both the Government and the SPLM.
This was a commitment that Landmine Action and SLIRI made to its principal sponsor,
the European Community. The difficulty was that, originally, neither the Government nor
the SPLM were willing to accord legitimacy to an organization that stood opposed to the
separate interests and the mutual suspicion that has defined Sudanese politics for at least
20 years. SLIRI did finally succeed in being registered as an NGO by the SPLM but not
by the Government in Khartoum.
Attempts to achieve official recognition and registration on both sides of the conflict have
a long history. When the Government was approached three years ago to initiate the
registration process, its National Mine Action Office proposed that the SLIRI programme
be attached to an existing organization, JASMAR, a mine action NGO operating under its
authority. SLIRI advisors declined. Affiliation with the Government’s JASMAR might
have guaranteed registration but it would have compromised the ideal of neutrality, and it
was a matter of principle that SLIRI be an indigenous, non-aligned organization.
Resentment lingers among ranking Government officials whose memories are long, and

there seems little question nowadays that from this bed of lingering resentment has
sprung a number of minor grievances which come up whenever the question of SLIRI’s
NGO registration is raised.
The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which has become an increasingly
influential fixture in the mine action landscape in the Sudan over the past three years,
might have defended SLIRI and supported its ideal, but it did not. In 2003, SLIRI’s early
advisors argued, perhaps rather boldly, that SLIRI should be the custodian of the
country’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), the data
processing and record keeping function maintained by most mine affected countries.
UNMAS’ Programme Manager at the time took offense at the proposal. He subsequently
went even farther by keeping SLIRI from having any access to IMSMA at all. Tempers
ran high and here again resentment lingers. Without access to the international data
management standard, SLIRI was obliged to develop its own software for recording its
survey data. SLIRI’s software was incompatible with the record keeping function kept by
UNMAS, and this incompatibility has given UNMAS staff reason to disparage SLIRI’s
efforts, to take issue with SLIRI’s use of the wrong kind of forms, and belittle the quality
of SLIRI’s data.
UNMAS works closely with the Government’s National Mine Action Office. It is
difficult to say whether this close collaboration with the Government has had a role in
UNMAS’ disinclination to support SLIRI, though many of those who were interviewed
suspected this to be the case. UNMAS shares an office complex with the Government’s
National Mine Action Office and when the Government took the decision to prohibit
SLIRI’s use of GPS equipment, UNMAS supported the decision knowing this would
cripple SLIRI’s ability to provide reliable data. It matters little that the dispute between
SLIRI and UNMAS sprang partially from personality differences or that these differences
might have been resolved with a little more patience on both sides; the result has been
that both the Government’s National Mine Action Office and UNMAS, separately and
together, have contributed to containing SLIRI’s attempts to become a nationwide NGO.
Landmine Action might have helped SLIRI avoid these difficulties with the Government,
the SPLM and UNMAS had its country directors been more tactful, though this is far
from certain. The Landmine Action country directors struck a firm posture toward the
Government’s NMAO and made contact with UNMAS only when it was absolutely
necessary. Only modest attempts were made by Landmine Action’s country director in
2004 to mend fences, even when a new UNMAS programme manager arrived in 2003
who was more supportive of SLIRI’s ideals, and who might have done more than his
predecessor.
Landmine Action and SLIRI faced a financial dilemma in early 2005 that would have farreaching consequences and compound SLIRI’s difficulties. The second tranche of
funding from the EC was inexplicably delayed. The delay had little effect on the
demining operators whose funding was otherwise assured, but it did take its toll on
SLIRI’s survey and community liaison activities, which relied on EC funding. Ten weeks
went by without resolution and Landmine Action was obliged to cut back its
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commitments to SLIRI for its work in the communities and it did so just as SLIRI was
completing the compilation of information using the United Nations’ IMSMA format.
The timing could not have been worse. The United Nations became even more
entrenched in its distrust of SLIRI. In September 2005, SLIRI’s dynamic Sudanese
director in Kadugli left to take a position elsewhere.
A larger organization with more human and financial resources than Landmine Action
might have found a way to bridge financing between payments. Landmine Action could
not and subsequently took the decision to bring in a larger partner for SLIRI. By mid
2005 Landmine Action had begun negotiations with HALO Trust to take over Landmine
Action’s role as international partner for all of SLIRI’s Sector Operations Centres in the
SPLM area and three in the Government area. SLIRI’s name has changed in these
locations to Sudan Landmine Response (SLR) and it remains to be seen whether the
name change is part of a significant change in strategy. A transition period presently
prevails.
From the beginning, Landmine Action set its sights for SLIRI high but no one, not even
those who have sought to contain SLIRI, would deny the boldness of SLIRI’s vision or
the value that SLIRI brings to the country. The Government continues to promise that
registration is still possible and claims to support the SLIRI ideal but new excuses are
perpetually found to prevent SLIRI’s registration as an NGO. UNMAS, at the national
level, regards SLIRI as a lost cause and in the Nuba Mountains, some UNMAS staff
disparage the value of SLIRI’s efforts as being “worse than zero.” It is difficult to
understand UNMAS’ readiness to take such outspoken exception to SLIRI’s work. It is
even more difficult to understand why UNMAS would do anything to diminish SLIRI’s
presence in the Sudan.
This evaluation report argues that Landmine Action and other associated international
partners should take measures to rescue SLIRI from its present decline, to resurrect
SLIRI’s reputation with UNMAS and to mend fences with the Government as it
continues to seek official recognition. The EC continues to actively support registration
for SLIRI, a sign that the EC maintains an interest in supporting the SLIRI ideal. The fact
that SLIRI no longer functions in the way it was envisaged does not mean it should not
do so or that it was not a good idea or that it did not do well. It has done well even if its
present circumstances are poor testimony. SLIRI functioned well in Phase I of European
Community funding and continued to function well, against some odds, in 2004 during
the first year of the European Community’s Phase II funding. Its accomplishments are
considerable especially considering the difficulties experienced in providing data
according to UNMAS’ standards. A neutral, national indigenous organization is a viable
and feasible ideal, and even if these first three and a half years have had disappointments,
they have provided lessons for avoiding the risks that a non-partisan, national institution
must navigate if it is to serve as a platform for implementing a peacebuilding campaign
through mine action.
A final, more general impediment has stood in SLIRI’s way as it stands in the way of
other innovative mine action organizations globally. Two divergent cultures divide mine
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action into separate camps. One is a military culture, and this military paradigm supports
high-cost, highly centralized military managed endeavors that conduct mine clearance as
stand-alone programs, as ends in themselves. An alternative paradigm regards mine
action to be less a military than a civilian or community matter whose ultimate purpose is
broader than mine clearance alone. The alternative paradigm places a significant measure
of authority over mine action in the hands of local officials or village leaders who are
encouraged to regard mine action as one among a menu of development needs: water
access, small loans, agricultural advice or education. This civilian, or community-based
approach that SLIRI espouses is suspect among military-trained staff in general, and the
military-inclined personnel at UNMAS in Khartoum particularly who regard giving
responsibility over disposing of the instruments of war too hazardous or too complex a
task for a local organization.
SLIRI is an idea whose time has perhaps not yet come, but whose time may come soon.
Funds will diminish for high-cost mine action. Donors will prefer to support mine action,
especially in lightly contaminated countries such as the Sudan, through community
development schemes managed through UNDP or international NGOs and will become
increasingly wary of investing in the centralized UNMAS operating procedures that insist
on quality standards that no local government could ever afford on its own. Sudan will
need an organization like SLIRI, even if its capacity does not yet measure high by
international standards.
Organization of the Report
Each of the report’s seven sections, with the exception of this Executive Summary begins
by raising a central question. Section Two, The Conflict, asks, “what aspects of the
conflict in the Sudan and the Nuba Mountains bear on Landmine/SLIRI’s capacity to
promote peace through mine action?” Each of the subsequent sections, from Section 3 to
7, address issues specifically raised in the evaluation’s Terms of Reference. Section 3,
The Survey, addresses the first two issues raised under the Terms of Reference, i.e. “to
identify strengths and weaknesses in the socio-economic impact and dangerous areas
surveys as tools for setting priorities in mine action programmes,” and “to gauge if such
priorities are linked to local peacebuilding needs.” Section 4, Peacebuilding, addresses
the third issue, “to assess whether socio-economic and dangerous areas surveys can be
used to design peacebuilding interventions in other areas of the Sudan.” Section 5, 6 and
7 do the same, covering each of the subsequent issues in turn.
Recommendations
Section 8 offers 10 recommendations for how Landmine Action and other international
partners might now proceed. The central theme of these recommendations is to re-place
SLIRI on a sound footing and, in future programming, to make institutional strengthening
of SLIRI the prime objective. It is in the long term interests of the international
community and the Sudan to restore SLIRI as the only non-aligned indigenous mine
action organization in the Sudan and to promote SLIRI’s involvement in information
gathering, community liaison and policy setting at both national and regional levels.
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2. The Conflict
KEY QUESTION: What aspects of the conflict in the Sudan and the Nuba
Mountains bear on Landmine Action/SLIRI’s capacity to promote peace through
mine action?
It is convenient though only partially correct to describe the conflict in the Sudan as
between the Arab Islamic North and the African Christian South. These affiliations have
become the main lines dividing those who oppose each other, though the reasons for the
conflict are more complex than ethnic or religious or geographic divisions. As in other
contemporary intra-national struggles, the basis of the conflict has more to do with
control over resources than ethnic loyalties, and the ethnic divisions are largely an
overlay on the conflict which, for the most part, involves disputes over oil, water and
land.
Even though the Nuba Mountains area is geographically situated in the northern half of
the country, and the Arab/African divisions have not traditionally been a prominent issue,
this changed in 1986. The trigger was an escalating contest for land between local
farmers and pastoralist tribes. The pastoralist tribes were armed by the Government
forces and trained as militias to move against the Nuban farmers cultivating the rich
valleys and terraced hills in the mountainous Nuba terrain. The Government’s ultimate
aim was at least in part to force the Nubans off the fertile valley land to make room for
agribusiness development by supporters of the National Islamic Front and to create a pool
of surplus labour out of the displaced Nubans.1
The Government’s aggression in the Nuba Mountains provided a rallying cry for the
SPLM among the Nubans, and between 1986 and 1989 the SPLM and its SPLA forces
established permanent bases in the area. Antagonism escalated. The aggressive
Arabization policies by the Government, part of its attempt to control the rich Nuban
valleys, made ethnic identity a major issue among the Nubans, and many Nubans aligned
themselves with the SPLM to be free from Government expansion. The Government, for
its part, used growing support for the SPLM as a justification for declaring a jihad and for
intensifying its offensive.2 By the mid-1990’s the Nuba Mountains had become the site of
intense conflict.
The Government pursued a deliberate “population clearance’ policy in the Nuba
Mountains area intended to disperse and ultimately relocate the civilian population from
villages in the Nuba to other parts of the Sudan. Villages were burned in their entirety,
cattle were stolen, and facilities such as schools and clinics were leveled obliging
1

International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, Africa Report no
39, January 2002, p. 144
2
Rebecca Roberts and Mads Fridlander, “Preparing for Peace: Mine Action’s Investment in the Future of
the Sudan,” in K. B. Harpviken and R. Roberts (Eds.) Preparing the Ground for Peace, Mine Action in
Support of Peacebuilding, Oslo: PRIO, 2004, p. 9
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residents to relocate to transit camps outside of the area or in towns, such as Kadugli.3
And by insisting that aid organizations funnel aid only through Khartoum, the
Government ensured that residents of the razed villages were left with little choice except
to move to camps where they would receive international assistance rather than rebuild
villages on their own. Access to food and humanitarian relief was used as a weapon, and
it was only when UNICEF’s Operation Lifeline Sudan negotiated access to displaced and
threatened populations in SPLM controlled areas that some relief was available. This
continued until early 2002 when representatives from Norway, Switzerland and the
United States, in separate initiatives, brought the warring parties together to agree on a
cease-fire.
A cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains area was formalized by the US/Swiss Birkenstock
Agreement on 22 January 2002. A Joint Military Commission established its
headquarters outside of Kadugli, centrally located in the Nuba Mountains area to
implement the agreement and to respond to challenges to the cease-fire. It was a model
peace-making initiative in two ways. It created a political space for peacebuilding
activities to take place, such as mine action; SLIRI’s mine action programme that
Landmine Action now manages was one of the first. And it set the pace for other
peacebuilding agreements. The Machakos Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation
of Hostilities was signed in Nairobi in October 2002, and both of these agreements
prohibited parties to the conflict from using landmines. The Nuba Mountains cease-fire
agreement was a precursor to, and paved the way for, the nation wide Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in 2005.
Though hostilities continued in pockets of the Nuba Mountains, the ceasefire agreement
made mine action possible even before there was peace and while a peace agreement was
being negotiated. The Joint Military Commission needed trained mine clearance services
to open humanitarian access and before mine clearance could start, basic surveys were
needed. The Danish NGO, DanChurchAid (DCA) worked closely with the JMC, trained
demining teams from both Government and SPLM forces and mounted clearance teams
in mid 2003. SLIRI was established in the Nuba Mountains area from the beginning of
the cease-fire and provided information on mined areas and landmine casualties. By
2003, these surveys were being used by SLIRI’s international partner, Landmine Action
for setting priorities in mine clearance operations. The two mine action programmes in
the Nuba Mountains – the one under DanChurchAid (DCA) and the other under SLIRI
and Landmine Action –started in the second year of the Joint Military Commission, well
before a peace accord had been signed and this has made their experience particularly
relevant for exploiting the potential of mine action as a peacebuilding activity.
It was originally thought, in 2002 before any mine clearance had been conducted and
surveys were just beginning, that anti-personnel mines had been widely used.4 An initial
3

International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, Africa Report no
39, January 2002, p. 145-148
4
It appears that the Government forces used anti-personnel mines predominantly to protect the garrisons
and outposts that they established inside strategically located villages; in these places, landmines were laid
to stop or funnel the advance of SPLA forces toward a garrison and to force them into a vulnerable
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estimate of casualties was high. There were reports of over 10,000 mines in the Sudan.
In 2002, the Government informed IRIN that anti-personnel landmines had caused 1,135
casualties in the Nuba Mountains in the 11 years between 1989 and 2001, an average of
107 per year.5 When SLIRI first started its own investigations into victims and incidents
in the Nuba Mountains, inquiries reported 387 casualties from both anti-personnel mines
or UXOs between 1998 and 2003, 77 per year.6 Over the past 18 months when the return
of displaced persons might have increased the number of accidents, SLIRI has reported
an average of 3 casualties a month, or 36 per year from landmines and UXOs, half the
number reported earlier by SLIRI and a third reported by the Government. As
information is accumulated and done so with more care, the estimates of the number of
victims and the number of landmines and UXOs are likely to diminish further.
Estimates are difficult because the memory of mine placement by army engineers and
other well-placed informants as well as reports of casualties are often inflated. Inflated
numbers benefit the Government and the SPLM by luring the sympathy and financial
assistance of donors into their mine action programmes, over which their respective
administration keep close control. But it has made it the more difficult to plan for how
best to tackle the problem. A needs assessment for mine risk education conducted by
DCA in the Nuba Mountains and published in April 2004 makes the same point: “…
contamination in the Nuba Mountains is scattered.”7 And the number of casualties from
anti-personnel mines, as a percentage of all explosive remnants of war is rather small,
less then 20 per cent. Clearly, the danger from anti-personnel mines is somewhat less
than originally expected.
This matters because the strategy for containing harm to the population depends largely
on the extent of contamination and if the contamination is modest and restricted to the
verges of impassible roads or the crests of hillocks, costly manual clearance may be less
of a viable strategy than educating residents to avoid contaminated areas. Mine clearance
might well be less of an emergency measure than part of a long term plan to expand
productive areas, and this means that establishing an indigenous capacity for identifying
and dealing with dangerous areas is perhaps more important than undertaking costly
clearance activities with international personnel in the short term. At the very least,
gathering accurate information and giving good advice to villagers is essential. This is
where SLIRI had the potential, and still has the potential, for serving a critical role in
reducing the landmines threat in the Nuba Mountains area.

position. SPLA forces had fewer permanent positions to defend and used anti-personnel mines less
frequently. Their strategy was to make it difficult for the Government forces to provision their positions,
denying access by laying anti-tank mines along transport routes.
5
IRIN, “Sudan, Food Deliveries Vital for Nuba Mountains,” May 2002
6
SLIRI, “Newsletter” March-May 2003
7
Uliks Hasanaj and Rune Hjarno Rasmussen, “MRE in the Nuba, A Survey to Assess the Need for Mine
Risk Education in the Nuba Mountains,” DanChurchAid and UNICEF, April 2004, p. 31
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3. The Surveys
KEY QUESTIONS:
(1)What have been the strengths and weaknesses in the socio-economic impact
and dangerous areas surveys as tools for setting priorities?
(2) Are the priorities linked to local peacebuilding needs?

Background
SLIRI has collected information in the Nuba Mountains for almost three years and
throughout this time, SLIRI’s survey activities have covered villages that are under both
Government as well as SPLM control. The Nuba Mountains survey data is the principal
concern of this evaluation. Data has also been collected, in six other survey sites in
Government controlled areas, and this data set covers mine action information
exclusively in Government controlled locations. Since the quality of the data from these
other six sites bears on SLIRI’s credibility as a survey organization, it is reviewed briefly
here as well.
There is furthermore another data set from SLIRI survey sites operating under SPLM
control. Presumably this information has been forwarded to SPLM authorities and, in
fact, may be kept in SLIRI’s own data base, but neither this evaluation nor other
interested parties have been able to access this information.
SLIRI’s Nuba Mountains survey was intended to help villages protect themselves, help
donors identify the areas most in need of mine risk education and help identify the areas
most in need of clearance. What the initial collection process lacked in expertise, it made
up in determination and SLIRI staff made a reputation for themselves for their use of
bicycles and motorbikes to travel to remote mine affected villages even during the rainy
season. SLIRI maintained a running record of landmine and UXO incidents, detailing the
type of device, whether the victim was a human, animal or vehicle, whether the human
was killed or injured and what the victim was doing when the event occurred. SLIRI
established a network of informants throughout the Nuba Mountain – and in other areas
under Government control - which has given SLIRI the most complete record available
from any organization. Up to the end of 2004, SLIRI data had contributed to information
on 1,269 landmine incidents (see Table 4.3.), which was slightly over 60 per cent of all
verifiable landmine incidents since 2002.8
SLIRI’s collection of data during these first two years, roughly July 2002 to August 2004,
was distinctive because it worked outside of the standard Information Management
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) protocols and guidelines. The IMSMA protocols,
guidelines and software had been denied to SLIRI and in their place, SLIRI advisors were
obliged to develop their own format for data collection known as the SLIRI Information
8

Interview with Mohammed Kabir, UNMAS IMSMA database manager, Khartoum, 24 October 2005
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Management System (SIMS). These two years can be considered a first period in SLIRI’s
survey activities.
The issue of SLIRI’s access to the data management standard was resolved in July 2004
when UNMAS provided SLIRI with the IMSMA software and with training to data entry
field personnel in Kadugli and Kauda in the Nuba Mountains. By August 2004, SLIRI
staff began producing information in the IMSMA format and this ushered in a second
period of survey work.
Between August and December 2004, SLIRI staff updated its existing material, revisiting
many of the villages with whom it maintained contact through the SLIRI network and
producing data on IMSMA forms. UNMAS’s quality assurance staff approved, and
SLIRI was finally able to participate fully in a UNMAS controlled nation-wide system of
data gathering. The results of this intensive four month effort constitute the output of the
second survey period. Work on this second period was cut short in January 2005 when
the second tranche of EC funding for Landmine Action was delayed forcing Landmine
Action to stop allocations to SLIRI’s survey activities.
There are, then, two sets of Nuba Mountains SLIRI data over approximately two and a
half years, collected in a first and second period. The first includes the data collected on
SLIRI’s own forms and protocols between July 2002 and August 2004. Since much of
this data has been incorporated in a 48 village summary, it is referred to here as the 48
village survey. The second includes data collected with IMSMA forms and protocols and,
up to the time when funding was stopped, SLIRI had accumulated data on 64 villages.
This is referred to as the 64 village study.
Setting Priorities
The SLIRI data has been used differently for setting mine action priorities in the first and
the second periods.
First Period, July 2002-August 2004
A complete compilation of SLIRI’s first period data has never been assembled. Because
it was not in the IMSMA format, only portions of it have been entered into the national
UNMAS database. An overview of the first period data must now be gleaned from SLIRI
newsletters, quarterly reports and files where updates were given regularly.
During SLIRI’s first survey period, Landmine Action advisors established a school for
deminers in Tillo, a small settlement outside of Kadugli. The first set of 26 deminers had
completed their training by February 2003 and were preparing for clearance operations.
A list of villages needing emergency clearance was based on the data collected by SLIRI
in the initial months of its research. Landmine Action drew on this SLIRI data in
conducting what was referred to as an Accelerated Village Data Confirmation
programme, in which the SLIRI data was verified and dangerous areas confirmed. Forty-
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eight villages were selected from the total number of villages on which SLIRI had
documentation.
Thirty-five of these villages were thought to be contaminated by landmines and UXOs.
From these thirty-five villages, between 10 and 15 villages were identified as most
urgently in need of clearance and the village leaders - Emirs, Omdas and Sheikhs - were
convened by SLIRI in Kadugli to discuss among themselves which should receive
attention first. Information on village contamination was presented by Landmine
Action/SLIRI staff. After a lengthy discussion, the group of village leaders came to the
unanimous decision that village Korongo Abdala should be cleared first followed by the
village Katsha.9 The village leaders valued these consultations.10 Landmines and UXO
contamination became a collective, village-level responsibility in ways it had not been
before, and the process guaranteed that the choice was made for humanitarian, not for
military or political reasons. As it turned out, the priorities were probably appropriate.
Clearance in the highest priority village, Korongo Abdala, removed 33 mines and 47
UXOs over a period of approximately 11 months, the highest number recorded so far in
the Nuba Mountains for a specific village area.
Second Period, August – December 2004
Using IMSMA protocols and guidelines, and with UNMAS training, the SLIRI twoperson teams in Kadugli (Government controlled) and Kauda (SPLM controlled)
compiled an updated list of 64 affected villages in the Nuba Mountains. The raw data on
these 64 villages was forwarded to UNMAS in Khartoum where it was assessed and,
using a ‘scoring system’ that assigns numeric values for a range of variables, UNMAS
assigned a composite ‘impact’ score that serves as the basis for giving an ‘impact-based’
priority ranking. A sample of the raw data on 64 villages can be found in Annex 1.11
UNMAS’ summary of this raw data using its scoring system has been labeled ‘Light
Impact Survey Priority and Weights by Village’ and is found in Annex 3. The scoring
system is in Annex 2.
UNMAS has now assumed full responsibility for setting clearance priorities in the Nuba
Mountains areas. Village leaders are not consulted. Presumably the priorities assigned in
UNMAS’ Light Impact Survey Priority and Weights by Village, based on SLIRI’s 64
village survey and analyzed in Khartoum by UNMAS database managers have been used
by UNMAS Kadugli in setting these priorities, though UNMAS Kadugli has not
acknowledged doing so.

9

Details about Katsha and other villages mentioned in this report can be found in Annex 1, a compilation
of information on casualties and mine areas for 64 villages.
10
Interviews were conducted with village leaders in Korongo Abdala who had participated in the
consultations.
11
This was provided by UNMAS Kadugli. It is a version of the raw data that has been extensively edited
and cleaned and does not represent the range of variables provided as raw data. After persistent
questioning, the evaluator discovered that the raw data is kept in Khartoum where it was released to him
only after considerable discussion.
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UNMAS has recently assigned Landmine Action an additional clearance operation in the
SPLM controlled village of Koyea. Koyea is an abandoned village where only six
households still live, reputed to have been heavily mined because of its proximity to an
SPLM controlled airstrip. The landmines, however, pose little immediate threat to a
population that has, for the most part, evacuated the place. After almost a half-year of
clearance operations, the teams have found only two mines in an area where UNMAS’
surveyors suspected as many as 200. This raises the question whether a village
consultation, similar to the one conducted by Landmine Action and SLIRI in 2003, would
have perhaps not regarded Koyea as a priority and chosen another location where the
threat to human lives was more immediate.12
SLIRI Data for Six Other SOC Sites in Government Controlled Areas up to Mid2004
In July 2004, SLIRI forwarded a compact disk to UNMAS of data assembled by the 7
Sector Operation Centres maintained by SLIRI in Government controlled areas. The
database included information on roads, villages, other mined areas, human casualties
and other incidents. UNMAS’ data management specialist in Khartoum conducted a
review with lessons for improving data quality. Three of the summary tables which the
data yielded are provided here, on (1) mined areas, (2) land use of blocked areas and (3)
victims. In all cases, the data has been cross-tabulated with location.
Table 4.1.summarizes the number of identified mined areas for each of six states.
Table 4.1. Number of Mined Areas by Location
State
Number
Bahr Al Jabal
31
Eastern Equatoria
7
Jonglei
2
Red Sea
100
South and West Kordofan 1
53
Upper Nile
7
Total
200
Source: Mohammed Kabir, “Data Presentation: SLIRI North,” UNMAS
1
South and West Kordofan cover the Nuba Mountains area.

Table 4.2. re-arranges information for all mined areas to classify them by how the mined
area is normally or potentially used. This gives a rough idea of the social and economic
impact of landmine contamination.
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See Sara M. Sekkenes, “Linking disarmament with local and national development: the example of Mine
Action” Norwegian People’s Aid, DRAFT, p. 9 for a discussion of the incompatibility between UNMAS
and NGO procedures for setting priorities
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Table 4.2. Classification of Mined Areas by Land Use
Reported Usage
Agriculture
Agriculture-forest
Agriculture – grass and wood collection
Agriculture - grazing
Agriculture – grazing, grass and wood
All agriculture uses
Forest only
Forest and grazing
Grass/wood collection only
Grazing only
Not used for productive purposes
Residential or household garden
Unspecified
Total

Number
6
1
25
34
2
6
1
1
2
67
1
1
53
200

Source: Mohammed Kabir, “Data Presentation: SLIRI North,” UNMAS

The data on victims contained 1597 incidents but only 1269 were listed in the IMSMA
data base since 328 incidents were submitted without the location being properly
identified. Those victims with locations identified are arranged in the following table.
Table 4.3. Number of Landmine Victims by Location
State
Western Bahr El Ghazal
Nuba Mountains
Warrap
Bahr Al Jabal
Red Sea
Upper Nile
Jonglei
Eastern Equatoria
Northern Bahr El Ghazal
Lakes
Western Equatoria
Total

Number of victims
321
299
188
149
121
94
45
20
16
12
4
1269

Source: Mohammed Kabir, “Data Presentation: SLIRI North,” UNMAS

While there have been some concerns about how data is presented, generally the SLIRI
data for Government controlled areas has been appreciated by UNMAS and the National
Mine Action Office.13
13

Mohammed Kabir, “Data Presentation, SLIRI North,” UNMAS, Internal Document
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Strengths and Weaknesses
The intrinsic value of SLIRI, as a non-partisan indigenous organization is reiterated
throughout this report and is repeated here. There are very few organizations in the
Sudan, if any, which do not have some stake in the conflict and in the institutions that
perpetuate it. SLIRI is an exception. Its non-partisan character is its strength. This has
also been problematic for SLIRI which must work closely with a number of other
organizations, North and South, and all of them in order to survive, have implicitly or
explicitly made their partisan alliances. It is laudable that SLIRI was eventually
recognized by the SPLM authorities, though not without difficulties. And it is perfectly
understandable that, in part because of SPLM’s recognition and in part because of
SLIRI’s principled neutrality that the Government National Mine Action Office has so far
rejected SLIRI’s application for NGO registration.
SLIRI’s competence as a survey organization raises a different matter. Mined area
surveys serve various purposes. They serve to identify villages where mine risk education
and follow up for victim assistance are required, and the SLIRI survey did this. Any
organization that wanted to know which villages needed a mine risk education
programme or victim assistance would find it in SLIRI records. Surveys are also expected
to serve a more rigorous purpose. They may be expected to identify with some precision
and technical savvy the limits of mine fields, the intensity of contamination, the affected
population and the threat to water access and livestock, and the claim has been that the
SLIRI data does not provide this level of precision. A cursory examination of SLIRI’s
data indicates that this claim may be partially, though only partially true. Even if it is
true, very little evidence has been provided to make the case.
The claim comes primarily from UNMAS staff, some of whom are outspoken on the
issue. SLIRI’s most recent 64 village data set and the priority setting based on this data
seems to serve as one of the bases for setting clearance priorities in the Nuba Mountains.
The performance of the survey activity was appreciated by UNMAS personnel in Kadugli
at the time.14 The UNMAS staff may nevertheless have their reasons for discounting the
quality of SLIRI’s data and for disparaging SLIRI as an institution, and some of these
reasons may include the following.
1. In 2003 when there was very little information on landmine/UXO contamination in the
Sudan, Landmine Action’s advisor,15 who had been instrumental in founding SLIRI,
envisioned SLIRI as the national custodian of landmine information in the Sudan. The
Programme Manager of UNMAS at the time took umbrage at his suggestion to have an
indigenous organization assume functions which, in his view, were the exclusive
responsibility of the United Nations. The legacy of hard feelings has not entirely
disappeared. When finally SLIRI had no choice but to relent, UNMAS Program Manager
denied SLIRI access to the IMSMA software. For SLIRI’s first two years, its data
followed a different format and UNMAS data managers resented, and resent still, the
14
15

SLIRI, “Impact Survey Summary Report,” Kadugli: August 2004
Rae McGrath
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extra work required to make it compatible with theirs. An indication of this legacy has
been that none of SLIRI’s extensive involvement in mine risk education has been entered
into the Nuba Mountains mine risk education database, a particularly surprising omission
given the observation by a recent UNICEF financed study of DanChurchAid in the Nuba
Mountains that SLIRI has had the most advanced surveillance system, network and
community awareness programme for serving mine risk education in the area.16
2. Beginning in 2003, SLIRI was the only organization in the Sudan collecting
information in areas controlled by the Government as well as by the SPLM. At one point,
there were eight SLIRI Sector Operations Centres collecting information in SPLM areas.
The SPLM authorities were reluctant to allow the information to be forwarded to
UNMAS or circulated widely, convinced as they were of the close links between
UNMAS and Government institutions. UNMAS staff has been displeased about this and
has assumed that SLIRI, itself, has been a factor in restricting their access to data from
the SPLM controlled areas.
3. There may be a tendency among some UNMAS personnel17 to distrust ‘community
based’ approaches to mine action. This has been mentioned by other commentators, and
it is worth noting that UNMAS has hesitated, in the past, to embrace a broader, more
inclusive concept of mine action that supports community involvement.18
Conclusion
There are different opinions about whether SLIRI’s data meets the standards upheld by
UNMAS. But there is agreement that SLIRI has functioned well in spite of substantial
odds; that SLIRI produced considerable data in many parts of the country where no data
had previously been collected; that this data has ably served to set appropriate clearance
priorities; and that SLIRI had the most effective network for providing mine-action
services such as mine risk education in the Nuba Mountains.

16

Uliks Hasanaj and Rune Hjarno Rasmussen, MRE in the Nuba, UNICEF and DanChurchAid, Mine
Action Team, 2004, p. 40
17
The present Programme Manager excluded.
18
Rebecca Roberts and Mads Frilander, “Preparing for Peace: Mine Action’s Investment in the Future of
the Sudan,”IN K. B. Harpviken and R. Roberts (eds) Preparing the Ground for peace, Mine Action in
Support of Peacebuilding, Oslo: Prio. P. 14. The authors write: “…the grass-roots ideology underpinning
SLIRI was at odds with the approach taken by UNMAS, which appeared to be advocating an
internationally led mine action programme that could be initiated more quickly. It has been alleged by
various organizations that UNMAS staff wanted to ‘do a kosovo’ – that is, a resource rich mine action
programme to achieve rapid clearance. Many Sudanese civil society organizations claim that they were told
by UNMAS that the Nuba Mountains would be cleared of mines within two years.”
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4. Peacebuilding
KEY QUESTION: Are the socio-economic and dangerous areas surveys
effective for peacebuilding interventions in the Nuba Mountains and in other
areas of the Sudan?
Introduction
A small body of literature has recently examined how mine action contributes to reducing
conflict by promoting peacebuilding. Mine clearance obviously removes the instruments
of war, often quite publicly, and the demonstration of their removal and destruction is a
powerful show of the strong backing for advocates of peace.19 But there are other ways,
four in particular, that have recently been cited to press the case for mine action’s
potential for encouraging peaceful dialogue. They fall under the broad headings: (1)
Governance and Political Framework, (2) Reconciliation and Justice, (3) Socio Economic
Foundations and (4) Security.20
Each of these four areas involves strategies for reducing conflict and building peace in
the context of mine action. The strategies are practical programming guides, but they are
also useful as a template or standard in guiding inquiry about whether mine action
programmes have realized fully their capacity to promote peace. They are, in this sense,
four areas in which a programme such as the Landmine Action/SLIRI one, has to perform
well. Column 1 of Table 6.1 gives these four areas and beside them, in column 2, are
concrete initiatives21 that fall under each of them. Column 3 gives the indicators, adapted
for this evaluation, to be considered in judging the Nuba Mountains Landmine
Action/SLIRI mine action own peacebuilding programme.
Targets or objectives for each of these indicators could be expressed for each one, and
they could also be given a numerical value in order to judge actual achievements against
these objectives. This would have been too complex for such a brief evaluation. Instead,
the performance of the programme on each of the indicators is ranked between 1 and 5
and the rankings totaled for all indicators to give a shorthand assessment of the
19

K. Harpviken and R. Roberts (Eds.) Humanitarian mine action and peacebuilding: exploring the
relationship, Oslo: PRIO, 2003; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peacebuilding – A Development
Perspective, Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 2004; E. M. Cousens, ‘Introduction’, in E. M. Cousins and C.
Kumar (eds.) Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner, 2001, pp. 1-20; Sara M. Sekkenes, “Linking disarmament with local and national development:
the example of Mine Action, DRAFT
20
D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebulidng: Getting their Act Together, Overview
Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo 2004;
Kathleen Jennings and Christian Ruge, “Killing many birds with as few stones possible: Integrating ERW
and SALW actions with peacebuilding and development efforts” Fafo New Security Programme, DRAFT;
Richard Moyes, “Introduction: Organising Humanitarian Assistance” Landmine Action, DRAFT
21
Kathleen Jennings and Christian Ruge, “Killing many birds with as few stones possible: Integrating
ERW and SALW actions with peacebuilding and development efforts” Fafo New Security Programme,
DRAFT
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peacebuilding programme as a whole. The total rankings and their rationales are given at
the end of this section and summarized in Table 6.5.

Table 6.1. Indicators Adapted for Evaluating the Landmine Action/SLIRI Peacebuilding
Programme
1
Category
1. Governance
and Political
Framework

2
Concrete Initiatives
• Institution and competence
building: planning, diplomacy,
advocacy and management
• Human rights and IHL
• Role for active and critical civil
society
• Engagement with non-state
actors

2.Reconciliation • Dialogue between former
and Justice
opponents
• Opening up of public space
• Trauma therapy and healing –
victim assistance
• Facilitation of evidence
gathering
3. Security
• Marking, fencing and clearance
• DDR, stockpile destruction,
removal of instruments of war,
employment of combatants
• Engage with SALW challenges
• Increased human security
4. Socio• Physical reconstruction
Economic
• Economic reconstruction
Foundations
• Infrastructure of health and
education
• Repatriation and return of IDPs
• Food security

3
Specific Indicators: Landmine
Action/SLIRI Evaluation
I. Successful creation of a nonpartisan institution at the national
level
II. Indigenization of a sustainable,
capable institution at both national
and regional levels
III. Contribution to an active and
critical civil society at the regional
and national level
IV. Increased cross-lines dialogue
between former opponents
V. Creation of a ‘community of
common concern’ among
groups/villages across conflict
lines
VI. Areas marked and cleared and
stockpiles destroyed
VII. Casualties and other
landmine incidents reduced

VIII. IDPs returned
IX. More secure livelihood
opportunities

This section assesses the Landmine Action/SLIRI Nuba Mountains programme as a
peacebuilding endeavor using the indicators in column 3 as guidelines. As suggested in
the Terms of Reference, this section also raises the question, in its conclusion, of whether
the Landmine Action/SLIRI strategy could be used elsewhere in the Sudan.
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Governance and Political Framework
I. Successful creation of a non-partisan institution at the national level
The original concept of SLIRI was explicitly to serve as an “indigenous, grass-roots
organization working with both sides of the conflict...”22 Over the past 4 years, SLIRI has
stood for a non-aligned cross-lines mine action body, and it differs from Sudan’s other
indigenous mine action organizations in this regard, notably JASMAR (Sudan
Association for Combating Landmines) under the authority of the Government and OSIL
(Operation Save Innocent Lives) under the authority of the SPLM. JASMAR and OSIL
are known publicly as NGOs, though para-government bodies is probably a better term
since along with other mine action NGOs, these operate under the authority of the
Government or the SPLM. When the idea of SLIRI as a non-aligned organization
managing mine action information for the Sudan was conceived, consultations were held
with JASMAR as a possible partner, but the difficult decision was made and made at
some cost, to establish a separate, neutral and unaffiliated organization.
A comparison with DanChurchAid (DCA), the other international NGO implementing
cross-lines mine action in the Nuba Mountains shows SLIRI’s unique character. The
DCA programme has maintained two demining teams, one from JASMAR and another
from OSIL and although they trained together, they work separately. While Landmine
Action/SLIRI trains and employs its own deminers, DCA’s deminers belong
institutionally to their home NGOs, JASMAR (Government) and OSIL (SPLM). In
principle, it is a good arrangement though in practice, it has been difficult because the
loyalty of the deminers remains, inevitably, with their institutional affiliations. DCA has
lobbied strongly with its two separate partners, JASMAR and OSIL, that the clearance
teams should be integrated but neither group agrees, and the compromise was reached
that the JASMAR (Government) teams would work in SPLM mined areas and the OSIL
(SPLM) teams would work in areas mined by the Government forces.
The compromise points to an instructive difference between DCA and Landmine
Action/SLIRI. DCA’s peacebuilding initiative is founded on the link that it forges
between two sides of the conflict, with JASMAR on the one hand and OSIL on the other.
By contrast, Landmine Action/SLIRI does not seek to reconcile the two sides but rather
to support a non-aligned organization – SLIRI – whose neutrality makes arbitration
unnecessary. Landmine Action/SLIRI operates on both sides of the conflict lines because
it never has been aligned with either side. DCA is in the business of compromise while
Landmine Action works without affiliation. When DCA takes an initiative, whether to
expand its operations or to intensify its cross-lines arrangements, agreements must be
reached between the two sides. DCA is presently re-considering its two-sided affiliation
22
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in order to operate as an independent, non-aligned international organization engaging
deminers as individuals rather than as members of existing, aligned organizations.
DCA’s compromise suggests a more general observation. Sudan’s two sides of the
conflict see little benefit in fully reconciling at the national level since this would
undermine their reason for existing. Any effort to integrate teams from the Government
and SPLM controlled organizations must perpetually face the fact that neither,
fundamentally, wants the full consequences of reconciliation which would effectively
dissolve their separate existences and their rationale for making claims, as they do
separately, on international donors. The decision by Landmine Action/SLIRI to operate
as an autonomous, strictly non-partisan organization has been a good one.
II. Indigenization of a sustainable, capable institution at both national and regional
levels
SLIRI sought to be registered as a national NGO by the Government and SPLM for two
and a half years, between 2002 and 2004, and faced numerous difficulties. Eventually,
SLIRI did receive official recognition as an NGO from the SPLM, but not from the
Government side. The Landmine Action/SLIRI project has consequently not succeeded
in establishing an indigenous institution at the national level. There might have been
more that Landmine Action could have done to court the authorities more diplomatically
though in the end, creating an indigenous and neutral mine action organization was bound
to engender opposition. Neither Landmine Action nor SLIRI can be held too rigorously
accountable for not being more successful.
III. Contribution to an active and critical civil society at the regional and national level
One of SLIRI’s unique features has been that, unlike other Sudanese mine action NGOs,
it is a genuine civil society organization. No other mine action NGO in the Sudan is free
from the authority of either the Government or SPLM authorities who serve as patrons or
protectors or direct participants. Its only patrons have been its technical advisors and
international partners, OXFAM UK and Landmine Action, and its funders, principally the
European Community. In the Nuba Mountains, notably, it has successfully linked villages
in a network of common interest to generate information and awareness about landmines,
and at the national level, it has been partially successful in creating an umbrella
organization operating in the North and South for generating information on casualties
and dangerous areas.
Reconciliation and Justice
IV. Increased cross-lines dialogue between former opponents
SLIRI has incorporated three specific cross-lines initiatives into its mine action
programme.
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1. It established Sector Operation Centres throughout the North and South and, as a
consequence, its organizational structure has institutionalized a cross-lines dialogue.
Branches in one part of the country have interacted frequently with those in another.
SLIRI’s organization in the Nuba Mountains area has been a microcosm of this national
character, linking two sites from opposite sides of the conflict line: (1) Kadugli in a
Government controlled area and (2) Kauda in a SPLM controlled area. Frequent
interaction between them has likewise constituted a cross-lines dialogue. Convening the
staff, in whole or in part, produced cross-lines interaction. These meetings only rarely
involved Government and SPLM authorities, but such meetings did occur first in 2001 at
SLIRI’s founding and again in May 2004 when ranking officials from the Government
and the SPLM, funders joined partners and advisors in a meeting to review SLIRI’s
future directions.
2. SLIRI’s survey activities in the Nuba Mountains are carried out by two-person survey
teams made up of a Field Officer and an Assistant Field Officer, each from different sides
of the conflict.
3. Survey team members in a given Sector Operation Centre may conduct investigations
in both Government and SPLM controlled areas.
V. Creation of a ‘community of common concern’ among groups across conflict lines
What began as a data collection scheme in the Nuba Mountains for SLIRI to assemble
basic mine action information developed into a far reaching network that by 2005 linked
over 50 villages in facilitating a flow of information from villages about dangerous areas
and victims and to villages for the purposes of assisting victims and villagers in
protecting themselves.
The survey in 2002 and 2003 initially brought SLIRI’s Field Officer in contact with
numerous villages as information on casualties and dangerous areas was recorded. But as
the survey continued and as visits were repeated to fill in missing information, stronger
ties were forged between the SLIRI office in Kadugli and participating villages. By early
2004, these ties had developed into a loose network and though at the time it had not been
formalized, SLIRI soon recognized the value of these ties, not only for providing a
regular flow of information on casualties and mined areas, but also as a vehicle for
disseminating information on increasing the capacity of villagers to protect themselves.
Once the loose confederation of villages linked by the flow of information took shape,
SLIRI gave it a formal structure connecting a group of two or three village committees to
a county or provincial level committee which in turn interacted with state level
committees all of which regarded Kadugli as their point of contact. At one point, there
were six state level committees receiving information from (and disseminating
information to) 21 county committees and these county committees were similarly
connected to over 50 villages. This made SLIRI potentially the most efficient and
extensive mine risk education and community liaison organization in the Nuba
Mountains.
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In the Nuba Mountains, village affiliations with one side or another of the conflict were
never that rigid since, for the most part, the demarcation lines drawn for the purposes of
the 2002 cease-fire were often arbitrary. Some villages with SPLM sympathies ended up
on the Government side of the line and vice versa. One village may have a Government
garrison in the town centre while, at the same time, households fly the SPLM flag on the
periphery. SLIRI’s network and community liaison programme muted the differences
that were open to question anyway, by assembling a large number of villages on both
sides of the demarcation line into a ‘community of common concern.’
Security
VI. Areas cleared and stockpiles destroyed
Efficiency is a standard performance indicator for most demining operations. It may be
measured by the number of mines lifted in a certain time period or by square meters
cleared in a certain time period. A cost benefit analysis is the most demanding of the
group of techniques that compares inputs into a production system to the goods and
services deemed critical outputs of the system. The goods and services can be measured
as immediate outputs by areas surveyed or areas cleared or lengths of road cleared or
devices lifted, or they can be measured as outcomes, i.e. the value of these new assets
when used for planting crops or traveling on roads. Increased security of these productive
resources has considerable peace dividends.
A cost benefit analysis is difficult to apply to mine action programmes because it is
difficult to measure the quantity of outputs and even more difficult if not near impossible
to measure the financial value of the outcomes. A more practical approach to measuring
efficiency is a cost effectiveness analysis which compares the cost or the time required to
produce the same level of outputs among different organizations, taking account of a
number of relevant factors such as different clearance assets. Even here, the exercise can
be no more than approximate since the analysis requires identifying the data problems,
making reasonable assumptions for how to address these problems and making sure that
the results are sensitive to reasonable changes in the assumptions. In this case, given the
modest amount of information available for different organizations working in the Nuba
Mountains, the best one can produce is some cost effectiveness conjecture.
The comparison here is between Landmine Action (LMA) and DanChurchAid (DCA) the
only two humanitarian demining organizations in the Nuba Mountains area. They work in
comparable terrains, difficult at the best of times, on abandoned roads that may be
overgrown with tall grass and trees or along the slopes of hills covered with loose rock.
The Government used anti-personnel mines on hill slopes and ridges to protect village
garrison against SPLM foot soldiers, and the SPLM soldiers used anti-vehicle mines
along roads to interrupt Government supply lines. Table 6.2. gives area and devices
cleared by DCA and LMA over the past two and a half years.
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Table 6.2. Comparison of Clearance for Two Organizations in the Nuba Mountains
Organization
Meters2
AP cleared
AT cleared
UXO cleared
DanChurchAid
99,685
206
3
336
Landmine Action
54,325
107
1
1490
Source: UNMAS, Kadugli, November 2005

DanChurchAid has been operating for 2.5 years with 2 teams and has operated, during
one of these years, with 4 teams, giving a total of 9 team years. During the same period,
Landmine Action has been operating for 2 years with 2 teams and a half-year with an
additional two teams, making a total of 5 team years. The disclaimer must be made that
there are differences in the management and size of teams, the building of team spirit, the
training, the terrain and the technique of working. A rough comparison is nevertheless
possible. Table 6.3. summarizes the values for the DCA and Landmine Action teams and
gives some indication of their comparative cost effectiveness. There appears to be very
little difference between DCA and Landmine Action in cost effectiveness expressed in
clearance rates. Otherwise said, Landmine Action meets the same respectable standards
that other comparable organizations in the area have maintained.
Table 6.3. Area and Devices Cleared per Team per Year
Organization
Team
Meters2 cleared/team/
years
year
DanChurchAid
9
11,076
Landmine Action
5
10,865

Devices cleared/team/
year
60
319.6

VII. Casualties and other landmine accidents reduced
It is near impossible to draw a direct connection between areas cleared and the reduction
of casualties since casualties may increase in the short run as areas are cleared. Residents
become less cautious and assume areas are safe when they may not be. Clearing land
attracts the return of IDPs who are less informed than residents and who are more riskinclined as they restart their livelihoods by farming in areas that may not be safe. A
recent study of mine risk education in the Nuba Mountains suggests that returnees are
typically the group most at risk for landmine accidents.23
SLIRI kept a monthly record of landmine incidents and published these in its quarterly
report and newsletter. Table 6.4. has been pieced together from these regular reports
which give the number of landmine incidents recorded for a given time period in the area
covered by the SLIRI network of villages. The coverage may have changed slightly since
SLIRI’s network was growing during the year and a half when these records were kept
and one might well expect casualties to grow as a result. But the more likely reason for a
greater number of human casualties beginning in the second half of 2004 was the
growing number of returnees who, after two years of peace in the Nuba were returning to
their home villages.

23

Uliks Hasanaj and Rune Hjarno Rasmussen, MRE in the NUBA, a Survey to Assess the Need for Mine
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6.4. Landmine Incidents Recorded by SLIRI in 2004 and 2005 for 6 provinces in the
Nuba Mountains area
Date range
No. of
Humans
Animals and Total of all
Incidents per
months
vehicles
incidents
month
01-03/2004
3
8
13
21
7/month
04/2004
1
3
3
6
6/month
05-07/2004
3
3
8
11
2.3/month
09-11/2004
3
11
17
28
9.3/month
01-04/2005
4
21
6
27
9/month
Source: SLIRI Quarterly Reports and Newsletters, 01/2004-04/2005

The point of these records has little to do with the impact of Landmine Action clearance
since clearance covered only a restricted area (three villages during this time). The point
is rather that the interventions by SLIRI, by Landmine Action and DCA in all aspects of
the mine action involving clearance, education and disposal of ordnances contributed to
the return of IDPs during this period. Figures vary widely, but a gross estimate would
suggest that as many as 41,000 IDPs returned to the Nuba Mountains during the period
covered by these records. What is surprising about these casualty records is not that
numbers increased slightly, since this is to be expected, but that the numbers have not
increased any more than they have.
Socio-Economic Foundations
VIII. IDPs returned
An estimated 13,000 IDPs returned to the Nuba Mountain area in 2003, an average of
1,100 per month. There was only a modest increase in 2004. In 2005, however, for the
month of May, 4,600 IDPs passed through an IDP checkpoint reportedly returning to
villages in South Kordofan. This is a four-fold increase over two years previous. At this
monthly rate, 55,200 can be expected in 2005, and overall, approximately 80,000 will
have returned between 2003 and 2005. To put this number into perspective, and assuming
the population of the Nuba Mountains is approximately 1.5 million, total returnees over a
three year period result in an increase of 5 per cent of the total population.
Questions posed to village leaders in the course of the evaluation confirm this picture. In
Katsha, a village of 10,000 where Landmine Action maintains a clearance operation,
village leaders estimated 500 returnees had arrived in the village, equal to five per cent of
the village population. In Abdala Korongo, a population of 13,000 where Landmine
Action has also conducted clearance operations, leaders estimated 800 returnees equal to
six per cent of the population.
The mine clearance operations have been a catalyst for their return since, according to
informants, the number of returnees was modest until mine clearance started and, once
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started, the flow increased. Clearance is on-going in Katsha and once completed,
villagers anticipate a greater number. But the presence of landmines does not appear to
have been the principal reason for their original departure nor is clearance, in itself, the
only reason for their return. Most of the IDPs departed because of the war itself. Cattle
were stolen and crops were requisitioned for troops, family members were injured, their
mobility was severely restricted and markets ceased to function. Families left to protect
themselves generally from the ravages of war, not necessarily from the threat of landmine
injury. Landmine clearance serves mainly to signal to IDPs that the war is over.
IX. More secure livelihood opportunities
The evaluation interviewed leaders and household members in two villages where
SLIRI’s survey and community liaison activities collected data and provided some mine
risk awareness, and where Landmine Action cleared mined areas. The interviewees
identified three significant impacts: (1) expansion of economic activity resulting from an
increase in population, (2) a diversification of diets, and (3) an increase in external
development assistance.
1. Economic activity
The return of IDPs has had the most significant of all impacts because the increase in
population has expanded economic activity. In the village of Katsha, a 25 per cent
increase in the number of small shopkeepers, from 8 to 10 has been the most visible
indication that conditions have improved, apart from the diversity of products for sale. In
Abdala Korongo shopkeeper income has increased sharply. While shopkeepers in Katsha
report a 20 to 25 per cent increase in monthly gross income, in Korongo Abdala where
the number of returnees is higher, two shopkeeper informants both reported increases
from 1,000-1,500 dinars per day to over 5,000 dinars per day, a three-fold increase, and
both of them have expanded their merchandise and the size of their shop.
2. Diet diversification
None of the respondents linked an increase in arable acres, resulting from mine clearance,
with an increase in income. The reason was that most of the cleared, arable acres are
close to the villages, on the hillsides or the slopes within the village that families use for
their household gardens. These are ‘gebracas” and are different from the sorghum and
millet fields which are generally far from the village and have not been affected by
landmine contamination. The value of sorghum grown on these distant fields has indeed
increased but this is due to poor rains and increased population, not mine clearance. The
real impact of clearance has come from greater access to family “gebraca” where
vegetables and fruits are raised for household consumption and now that families feel
safe in using them, production on these small plots has increased and diets have
diversified.
3. Development Assistance
Mine identification and clearance bring in development assistance. In both of the villages,
Katsha and Abdala Korongo and throughout the areas where mine clearance occurs, local
and international NGOs now provide clinics, water and other services, services that had
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not been available before. Mine clearance attracts outside assistance by reducing the
threat of injury to the staff of charitable organizations.
Peacebuilding Performance Ranking
The summaries, below, justify the ranking of the programme’s performance for each
indicator on a scale of 1 to 5. Table 6.5. assembles all the summaries in a single table to
give a composite assessment for all indicators.
Indicator I - Successful creation of a non-partisan institution at the national level:
Landmine Action/SLIRI has successfully created a non-partisan institution at the national
level against considerable odds. It was, in conception and as long as it lasted, a
considerable accomplishment. Performance Ranking = 5
Indicator II - Indigenization of a sustainable, capable institution at both national and
regional levels: SLIRI was, at its inception a genuine indigenous organization and
ideally should have developed as a viable institution more than it has. This did not
happen. Landmine Action might have done more to promote and strengthen SLIRI
though clearly there were many factors contributing to its present tenuous status which
were out of Landmine Action’s control. Performance Ranking = 3
Indicator III - Contribution to an active and critical civil society at the regional and
national level : Even if SLIRI does not survive, its presence over a period of four years
has contributed to promoting activist civil society organizations and raising the standards
for their performance particularly in its very principled cross-lines strategy. Performance
Ranking = 4
Indicator IV - Increased cross-lines dialogue between former opponents: Landmine
Action has supported SLIRI in its cross-lines activities, in team composition, staff
meetings and data collection. It might have integrated its own mine clearance teams
better, but it has not and its support for SLIRI’s activities in general has waned recently.
Performance Ranking = 4
Indicator V - Creation of a ‘community of common concern’ among groups across
conflict lines: SLIRI’s creation of a network of villages from both sides of the conflict as
part of its data collection and community liaison work is a remarkable innovation. It is all
the more unfortunate that it has not been sustained by either Landmine Action or other
international organizations in the Nuba Mountains. Performance Ranking = 5
Indicator VI - Areas marked and cleared and stockpiles destroyed: Landmine Action’s
clearance teams work efficiently, have been accredited to work on their own and are
highly regarded by international organizations in the area. Performance Ranking = 5
Indicator VII - Casualties and other landmine incidents reduced: Landmine Action and
SLIRI programmes have meant that casualties are less than they would have been without
intervention. But effective casualty reduction requires finding the appropriate balance
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between clearance operations on the one hand and facilitating the flow of information
about mined areas and landmine awareness on the other. A better balance remains to be
achieved. Performance Ranking = 4
Indicator VIII - IDPs returned: IDPs are returning as expected and mine clearance, where
it has taken place, serves as a catalyst. The programme is working as planned in cleared
areas. On the other hand, Landmine Action does not appear to have utilized SLIRI’s
extensive network of community contacts to facilitate IDP returns in the numerous other
villages to which IDPs are returning without the benefit of mine clearance. Performance
Ranking = 4
Indicator IX - More secure livelihood opportunities: Mine clearance is one aspect of the
peace process, which has encouraged the return of IDPs, restored some land and attracted
development assistance. Landmine Action has recently emphasized clearance more than
other mine action inputs and where clearance has taken place, the results are promising.
But aiming to provide clearance on any significant scale is impractical and Landmine
Action might well have considered that a more balanced approach to mine action might
have brought benefits to a wider area with more beneficiaries. Performance Ranking =4
Table 6.5. Programme Performance Ranking on Key Indicators (Ranking 1-5)
Category
Ranking
1. Governance and Political Framework
I. Successful creation of a non-partisan institution at the national level
5
II. Indigenization of a sustainable, capable institution at both national and 3
regional levels
III. Contribution to an active and critical civil society at the regional and 4
national level
2. Reconciliation and Justice
IV. Increased cross-lines dialogue between former opponents
4
V. Creation of a ‘community of common concern’ among groups across
5
conflict lines
3. Security
VI. Areas marked and cleared and stockpiles destroyed
5
VII. Casualties and other landmine incidents reduced
4
4. Socio-Economic Foundations
VIII. IDPs returned
4
IX. More secure livelihood opportunities
4
38
Total
85%
Per cent of perfect score
Conclusion
The dangerous areas surveys and their application to clearance have served peacebuilding
in the Nuba Mountains area reasonably well. The analysis summarized in Table 6.5.
suggests that the programme has accomplished nearly nine-tenths of what might ideally
have been expected, and this is quite commendable.
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The Nuba Mountains is unique in the Sudan since it is the setting of Sudan’s first formal
cease-fire. It is commonly agreed that the Nuba Mountains cease-fire was an uncommon
success and paved the way for the peace agreement adopted three years later in both the
Nuba Mountains and for the country as a whole. It was an ideal place for an experimental
mine action programme to serve the broader purpose of constructing a more peaceful
environment.
The Landmine Action/SLIRI model of combining surveys, intensive community liaison
and mine clearance in a single programme and, in particularly, involving the communities
themselves in most stages of the process, clearly has the potential for working throughout
the Sudan. It will perform less well where the stakes are higher in prosecuting the conflict
and where the lines of hostility are more firmly drawn. They were not firmly drawn in the
Nuba Mountains. In some sense, the Nuba Mountains provided a favourable proving
ground. There will be other grounds less favourable and while more difficult, these other
grounds may be more appropriate and more challenging venues for the peacebuilding
programme.
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5. The Cross-lines Strategy
KEY QUESTION: Is the SLIRI Cross-lines Programme Efficacious?
Landmine Action and SLIRI have done more than arrange token encounters and
collaborations between individuals from opposing sides. They have aimed at investing
the efforts of adversaries to remove landmines in a single non-aligned institution which
places its institutional objectives above the separate interests and claims of the two sides.
The reason why it must be considered successful is not that it granted full recognition to
both sides of the conflict, but rather explicitly that it did not overtly recognize the
legitimacy of either of the two sides. SLIRI’s conciliatory potential came from the fact
that it was one organization, not two, and this gave the phrase ‘cross-lines’ a weightier
nuance since the objective was to dissolve the two sides, not respect or resolve them.
The principle of non-alignment bestowed on SLIRI its unique character as well as an
element of controversy for SLIRI occupied a moral high ground that was threatening to a
number of partners who might otherwise have been supporters. SLIRI held to its principal
of neutrality by refusing alignments with other NGOs that operated under the authority of
one or the other side of the conflict. This made it difficult for SLIRI to secure patrons
since all aligned organizations have considerable stakes in remaining so and
organizations with political stakes are reluctant to promote ones without them. Political
stakes translate readily into funds: Government bodies are funded by their superiors who
have their own patrons with their own stakes in a state of conflict that justifies their
continued existence. NGOs are their clients and receive funding with the blessings of
their patrons. Access to donors is inevitably made through those patrons who, openly or
not, are dependent on their place in a hierarchy of affiliation.
SLIRI survived in spite of its detractors. It had a reliable funder for three and a half years,
the European Community, which looked to SLIRI to achieve the promised ideal of
securing official recognition from both sides of the conflict. This meant receiving official
recognition as an NGO, capable of operating independently and receiving funds on its
own, from both the Government’s National Mine Action Organization (NMAO) and
SPLM’s Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (SRRC). Efforts were stymied on
both sides as neither side gave full support originally. Relations frayed between
personalities in the heat of the effort. Finally SPLM’s SRRC, under the direction of an
enlightened director, granted recognition, but the Government’s NMAO never has. SLIRI
has therefore not been able to meet original expectations and become a nationwide
indigenous and neutral mine action body.
The cross-lines strategy has built relationships that otherwise would have remained
dormant or adversarial, and in this sense, it has been efficacious. On the grander scheme,
SLIRI remains unrecognized nationally. Perhaps this was inevitable and perhaps nothing
more could have been done, but the fact remains that it has not met its ultimate objective.
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Conclusion
The institution spanned conflict lines in a number of senses. It had survey teams in both
Government and SPLM controlled areas and its two person survey teams in the Nuba
Mountains came from both sides of the conflict. This was testimony to its peacebuilding
intentions and no doubt, hostilities were reduced by SLIRI presence alone. The question
for SLIRI was not whether it was prepared to take the bold step of spanning conflict lines
but what would be the political and financial consequences. As it turned out, SLIRI could
not overcome the difficulties for an organization that was so squarely non-aligned and
eventually its international partner, Landmine Action, took the regrettable but necessary
step of withdrawing support when it became clear that it had neither the financial nor
human resources to maintain the required level of assistance. The nobler choice for
Landmine Action might have been to do what was necessary to make SLIRI succeed, to
persist in its diplomatic advances, and while maintaining a modest presence in the
clearance field, to invest more heavily in human and capital resources to strengthen
SLIRI enough to ensure its survival.
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6. Community-based Mine Action
KEY QUESTION: What has been the relevance of SLIRI’s programme to local
community needs with special attention to women and disabled persons?
SLIRI’s principal function was to collect information on landmine casualties, their
location, circumstances and consequences. Information collection took place in two
different periods, one less structured using protocols devised by SLIRI advisors
themselves, and a subsequent more structured period of work carried out in collaboration
with UNMAS Kadugli. In the first period, SLIRI assembled a network of village contacts
from the villages surveyed and, in many of these, SLIRI identified local volunteers who
served the village by sending and receiving information. The network grew to include
formal links to a large number of villages and structured so that village contacts would
report through local councils and county committees to the office in Kadugli.
The network made it possible for SLIRI to proceed quickly with the second survey
period. It also made it possible for SLIRI to deliver other kinds of services, provide
victim assistance, make awareness programmes available and train leaders in helping
villagers avoid injury.
Although the network never became officially recognized as either an objective or an
outcome of the project, its importance rivaled the surveys.24 When it began, there was
very little landmine awareness and only a handful of NGOs providing mine risk
education. When information about a human casualty reached head office through the
network, a Field Officer visited the village to monitor the status of the victim, provide
assistance where needed, gather information and conduct public sessions on how to avoid
further accidents. The disabled victim became a rallying point and participant in the
information sessions.
SLIRI’s mine risk education programme delivered through this network was the largest
and most effective in the Nuba Mountain area and recognized as such by other NGOs.
“When it comes to community work the most advanced is undoubtedly SLIRI who has
established a far reaching surveillance system counting 38 local networks in mine
contaminated communities. These networks consist of local military engineer’s village
elders and chiefs. The local networks have the role of post incident monitoring and
sustaining the MRE. The MRE community should follow the SLIRI example and draw
all they can on the SLIRI competence in establishing this kind of community network to
receive IDPs with MRE and collect information.”25
24

Landmine Action’s Phase II European Community project executed in December 2003 with the
European Community acknowledges the presence of these community networks as a mechanism for
extending the scope of the programme, but they do not figure among the distinguishing features of either
Phase I or Phase II objectives.
25
Uliks Hasanaj and Rune Hjarno Rasmussen, MRE in the Nuba, A Survey to Assess the Need for Mine
Risk Education in the Nuba Mountains, Kadugli:UNICEF and DanChurchAid Mine Action Team, 2004

29

Attention was everywhere accorded to women and children, though it happened that
women were rarely landmine victims; in fact none of the 49 landmine victims reported in
SLIRI reports for 2004-2005 were women. A larger victim data set from DanChurchAid
using report forms for 152 casualties registered only 6 female victims, 4 per cent of the
total. In Nuban society, women do not engage in the most risk-inclined activities and this
partially explains the low involvement of women in accidents and in public awareness
campaigns. Women were therefore not singled out as dedicated targets in SLIRI’s
community liaison programme, though they did participate in the network, worked
closely with the female Assistant Field Officer, and attended meetings of the network.
Conclusion
SLIRI committed itself fully to focusing its mine action activities on serving community
needs and did so innovatively, linking communities together in a network of mutual
assistance and training local leaders on steps for reducing accidents among villagers and
returnees.
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9. Sustainability
KEY QUESTIONS:
1. Is the SLIRI programme sustainable once LMA has devolved full managerial
control to the SLIRI programme?
2. Is there potential for continuation of the programme’s impact if there is no
further input from donors?
3. Does the SLIRI crosslines approach offer value for money? Is it an efficient
way to implement mine action interventions in the Nuba Mountans?
4. Are SLIRI future strategies viable?
SLIRI’s Sustainability
SLIRI is Landmine Action’s brainchild. It was spawned in the course of a cross-lines
meeting in 2001 among a number of Sudanese mine action organizations sponsored by
Landmine Action, and the relationship between Landmine Action and SLIRI has
continued for three and a half years. SLIRI has relied on its international partners,
OXFAM UK and Landmine Action for its existence and now as its international
partnerships are less certain, so SLIRI’s future has come into question.
SLIRI became an increasingly complex and demanding partner after 2003. Its
administrative and financial resources were stretched as it sought to establish itself
nationwide putting in place a number of survey sites (Sector Operation Centres) in both
Government controlled and SPLM controlled areas, each with a pair of surveyors and the
required logistical resources. Landmine Action served only as technical advisor in Phase
I of European Community funding (June 2002 – December 2003) but when Phase II was
approved, Landmine Action assumed the functions of both technical advisor and
international partner.
The Sudanese mine action landscape was changing and becoming more challenging
during Phase II of EC funding. There were more donor funds available for mine action
than before and with them, competition intensified among Sudanese mine action
organizations to capture the windfalls. SLIRI’s status as a neutral organization worried
the politically partisan bodies – on both the Government and the SPLM sides – who had
created mine action organizations each with grand aspirations. This meant that Landmine
Action would have to meet its advisory obligations as well as navigate SLIRI through
difficult political waters. These were onerous tasks.
Landmine Action and SLIRI were to perform complementary functions in Phase II.
SLIRI was to gather information on mined areas while Landmine Action, with its
clearance “response” teams, would clear the areas that SLIRI identified as most
contaminated. But by 2004, the administrative and political complexities of managing the
project began to erode this complementarity. Landmine Action was making little progress
getting SLIRI officially recognized by Government authorities and in fact, it seemed as if
the Government was raising ever more obstacles. UNMAS took over the function of
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assembling information and deciding where to clear, in some instances dismissing the
credibility of SLIRI data. At the same time, Landmine Action was forced to recognize
that its budget was insufficient for maintaining the growing number of Sector Operations
Centres, supporting the Nuba Mountain survey, plus training and maintaining Landmine
Action’s own mine clearance operations.
Landmine Action had to make some difficult decisions in early 2005 when EC’s second
tranche payment was delayed and a budget crisis loomed. Landmine Action reduced its
commitment to SLIRI’s Sector Operations Centres throughout the country. The Nuba
Mountains office felt the cuts particularly since the Nuba Mountains SOC was on the
verge of completing its 64 village survey of mine-affected villages in collaboration with
UNMAS format. SLIRI’s reputation suffered when it abandoned the survey mid-stream.
Inevitably, the reduction of Landmine Action’s financial commitment was accompanied
by a reduction in its support, more generally, to the SLIRI ideal. Landmine Action
focused its attention primarily on its mine clearance operations and the complementarity
between SLIRI’s outreach activities and Landmine Action’s clearance operations
effectively disappeared. Without funds, SLIRI’s activities came to a halt, its existence in
jeopardy. Landmine Action took the decision to bring in a new partner, HALO Trust, to
assume Landmine Action’s partnership role in all of SLIRI’s SOCs in the SPLM area and
three SOCs in the Government area.
SLIRI’s new partnership with HALO Trust is still being negotiated and so far, funding is
insufficient to restore SLIRI’s activities to their previous level. As of November 2005,
Landmine Action had withdrawn involvement from all but two sites in Government
controlled areas, the Nuba Mountains (Kadugli) and the Blue Nile (Damazzin). SLIRI’s
future, tenuous as it is, depends as before on decisions taken by its present and future
international partners.
SLIRI without Donor Support
One of the explicit objectives of the European Community’s funding was “to ensure that
SLIRI is a registered, independent NGO by the end of Phase II.” Whether this was ever
feasible is another question, and opinions differ on the matter. It did not happen and even
though many of the Phase II objectives were met, this one was not and the European
Community may have understandably judged it impractical to invest further in SLIRI
becoming an independent Sudanese-wide NGO. The European Community’s decision
may have been symptomatic of the risks that many donors associate with funding a small
NGO in the Sudan where political rivalries leave little space for an independent
organization. Without funding, SLIRI has very little chance of surviving, except as a
small group of volunteers.
An organization like SLIRI is doubly disadvantaged. Independent as it is, it will probably
not find a supportive niche within either the Government or the SPLM authorities. Nor is
it likely to be an attractive investment for multilateral donors since United Nations
agencies and organizations actively encourage bilateral donors to funnel assistance
through United Nations organizations. SLIRI might well be adopted, in an exceptional
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circumstance, by a sympathetic bilateral donor willing to make a long-term commitment,
but this is somewhat unlikely. It will continue to rely on the largesse of international
NGOs, like Landmine Action, HALO Trust perhaps and others.
Why has Landmine Action not taken more substantial measures to secure SLIRI’s future
during the recent crisis? Practical considerations probably have taken precedence over the
ideological affinities between the two organizations. It required a strong resolve to
support SLIRI’s non-partisan, cross-lines programme, when both the Government and the
SPLM authorities would have preferred an organization that served one or the other of
their separate interests. When UNMAS itself declined support for SLIRI, it required an
even stronger resolve to keep SLIRI going. There was a change in Landmine Action
personnel when the original advocates departed and in their place were administrators
with less firm resolve, less stature and less of the diplomatic skill to usher SLIRI into the
right kind of alliances and collaborations. Eventually, the practical obstacles were
insurmountable. None of this, however, is irreversible.
The Cost Effectiveness of a Cross-lines Strategy
A cross-lines programme is idealistic by nature, advocating collaborative dialogue in an
environment that is hostile and opportunistic and as such, is likely to be cost effective in
only the most favourable circumstances. The Nuba Mountains might have been one of
these. Parties to the conflict there were willing to endorse a cross-lines strategy and this
meant that mine action services could be extended to a larger population than would
otherwise be the case. There might have been some efficiency gains as a result. A cost
effectiveness analysis might show that a mine action program in the Nuba Mountains
with a cross-lines component generates greater economic returns on a larger scale as a
result of a more sensitive approach to prioritization and the greater incentives it provides
for returnees to resume their economic lives; and all this with more modest inputs than
mine removal exercises that have little social component. Such a comparison has not
been possible for the Nuba Mountains area though the rudiments of a cost effectiveness
analysis are given on pages 23-24.
That said, judging cross-lines programmes by their economic return probably misses the
real merit of incorporating peacebuilding initiatives whose value is difficult to measure.
All the more reason to applaud the European Community’s willingness to take a risk in
supporting the Landmine/SLIRI programme knowing that the parties to the conflict in the
Sudan were unlikely to agree on much, much less on how to implement a mine action
programme for surveying and clearing dangerous areas. The European Community
provided support anyway on the off chance that the programme would give a boost to
national reconciliation. Cross-lines programmes in conflict zones are not likely to be
chosen for their efficiency, certainly not without better odds of success than can be found
in the Sudan.
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SLIRI’s Future
A reputable non-partisan institution like SLIRI is essential for any peacebuilding mine
action programme to endure beyond the support of expatriate experts and donors. SLIRI
was originally conceived for this reason, as the long-term institutional anchor for a mine
action programme in a post conflict country where political affiliations are both
unavoidable and problematic. SLIRI succeeded in avoiding affiliations, but largely as a
consequence, it has not succeeded in supporting itself either from government or
international NGOs or donor funds. Satisfying the institutional side of sustainability has
undermined its capacity to satisfy the financial. The fact is that SLIRI is not a very
promising investment if the result anticipated is to create a self-sustaining, selfsupporting organization. But if seen from another perspective, which is the creation of an
organization that stands conspicuously for a neutral, peacebuilding mine action
programme, SLIRI continues to have promise.
Conclusion
SLIRI has so far achieved neither institutional permanence nor financial sustainability. A
non-aligned organization in a post-conflict environment, where parties to the conflict
continue to define the political landscape, are bound to have difficulty getting political
approval. Donors are not likely to fund an organization for any period of time that, by
virtue of its non-partisan status, goes so squarely against the political grain and therefore
lacks political support. Without continued outside support from an organization willing to
back an innovative mine action organization, an organization like SLIRI has little chance
of having an impact over the long-term.
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8. Recommendations
The gist of the ten recommendations that follow is for Landmine Action and other
international partners to re-place SLIRI on a sound footing. It is in the long term interests
of both Landmine Action, other international partners and the Sudan to restore SLIRI as a
non-aligned indigenous mine action organization in the Sudan and to promote SLIRI’s
involvement in information gathering, community liaison and policy setting at both
national and regional levels.
This evaluation is cognizant of the difficulties these kinds of recommendations pose.
Landmine Action has made a decision to distance itself from SLIRI for understandable
reasons. Potential international partners might reasonably argue that there is neither
financial nor political support for an organization such as SLIRI and future support is
likely to encounter the same difficulties it has in the past. But international mine action
partners have only a limited menu of choices. One option is to withdraw from the country
altogether leaving SLIRI to seek support as it can. Another is to provide resources
through multilateral organizations which themselves maintain privileged links to partisan
organizations in the country. Another is to continue supporting the modest clearance
activities in the one or two villages which have, at best, limited impact and contribute
little to advocating alternative mine action approaches. A fourth is to revive Landmine
Action’s policy of providing independent support for indigenization that has the potential
of greater social and economic impact and that contributes to advocating for innovative
solutions to landmine contamination. As difficult as it may be, this final option appears
the only feasible one because it gives SLIRI a distinctive niche, it builds on SLIRI’s
strengths and it is more likely than other mine action strategies to achieve far-reaching
benefits for peacebuilding in the Sudan.
The following recommendations are designed to accomplish this overall objective. They
do not pick up where Landmine Action left off when the unavoidable decision was taken
to reduce support for SLIRI. They do not attempt to restore the programme pursued under
Phase II of European Community funding. The ultimate objective of building indigenous
capacity for mine action is the same, but these recommendations set about achieving it
differently.
Recommendation 1: The centre of operations and SLIRI’s national headquarters should
be shifted to Kadugli in the Nuba Mountains. This locates SLIRI in more neutral
surroundings. A modest presence might be maintained in Khartoum but only for the
purposes of displaying results and giving briefings to national and international
collaborators.
Recommendation 2: It is imperative that the results of SLIRI’s surveys be compiled in a
comprehensive fashion as soon as possible and be disseminated widely. This report has
attempted to demonstrate that these results are grossly undervalued. A complete
compilation and presentation of SLIRI’s data, along with how this data has contributed to
making key mine action decisions, should correct this situation.

35

Recommendation 3: Every effort should be made to expand the existing deminer
training school in Tillo outside of Kadugli into a National Mine Action Centre, possibly
situated in an expanded complex adjacent to its present facilities. This expanded facility
will be in a position to serve a number of functions, one of which will be to serve as
SLIRI’s national headquarters (see Recommendation 1.). It will also provide a locus for
coordinating advocacy efforts in the area of peacebuilding and mine action.
Recommendation 4: This National Mine Action Centre should furthermore serve as one
of the national repositories of mine action information, not supplanting UNMAS but
complementary to it. SLIRI’s data should be analyzed and on display. The national
IMSMA database, maintained primarily by UNMAS in Khartoum and elsewhere, should
also be accessible with the associated facilities to produce maps, analyze data, assign
information gathering tasks and produce regular reports on dangerous areas, casualties
and policy issues.
Recommendation 5: It should also support SLIRI’s community liaison activities through
a network of linked communities that serves to receive information as well as disseminate
information throughout the network. This successful innovative approach to mine action
community liaison should be replicated in other areas of the Sudan.
Recommendation 6: A further function will be to support a mine action raining facility.
This mine action training centre should aim to be the principal school for training
deminers in the country, the place where accreditation is given and accepted by both
Government and SPLM. There are indications that UNMAS Kadugli would be
supportive.
Recommendation 7: While training deminers from Government and SPLM controlled
areas in both full and refresher courses, the National Mine Action Centre should also
offer courses to deminer candidates and to others in a broad range of mine action and
community development competencies. These should include, at a minimum, survey
skills, data management for mine action information, conflict resolution and community
development programming in health, small scale finance and agricultural production.
Recommendation 8: The National Mine Action Centre should be administered by SLIRI
and be identified with SLIRI as an organization. SLIRI’s identification with this National
Mine Action Centre will provide a justification for the Government to officially
recognize SLIRI as a national NGO.
Recommendation 9: Landmine Action mine clearance activities should be reduced to, at
most, one full team. This mine clearance response team should be based at the training
centre and used (1) as a training resource associated with the National Mine Action
Centre and (2) for deployment to urgent mine clearance operations identified in
collaboration with UNMAS.
Recommendation 10: The National Mine Action Centre should undertake community
development initiatives in the Nuba Mountains area and beyond as opportunities arise,
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incorporating mine action into programmes for improving agricultural production,
improving access to water facilities and providing health and micro-finance facilities.
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ANNEX 1: 64 NUBA MOUNTAINS VILLAGES SURVEYED BY SLIRI
AUGUST-DECEMBER 2004 – A PORTION OF THE RAW DATA
Sn
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Dname
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan

Sname
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Dileng
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli

vname
Abri
Abuad
Al Gnei
Al Laghair
Brakandi
Dari
Dulami
Julud
Kabila
Kalandi
Katla
Magda
Nieil
Tukma
Wali
Abu Snoon
Addar
Agab
Al Azraq
Andulo
Angulo
Atmor
AtTaiss
Bilynga
Boram
Dabakia

No HH
125
150
0
0
60
100
450
2000
92
0
400
0
165
0
3000
500
2000
52
500
275
0
833
833
182
1666
583

HH Affected
0
20
0
0
0
0
5
10
0
0
50
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
20
30
0
0
50
18
0
20
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IDPs Expected
4000
2000
0
0
1000
4000
7000
5000
300
10000
400
0
72000
0
5000
3000
1000
200
5000
500
0
500
1200
300
2000
1000

LifeThreatening
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No of DA's
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
3
0
3
5
1
0
0
9
1
1
2
1
1
0
0
5
1
1
1
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28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan
S. Kordofan

Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli
Kadugli

Daliuka
Damba
Damik
Eiri
Fama
Ganaya
Heiban
Karkar
Karkaria
Katsha
Kauda
Kiga Al Kheil
Kofa
Koyea
Krongo
Kubang
Kulolo
Miri Juwa
New Masakin
Ragafi
Rieka
Sama
Shat Damam
Shatel Sufya
Taballa
Tabania
Tangal
Trogi
Um Durain
Um Serdiba

300
300
1831
2660
1500
800
833
700
833
1299
700
322
97
0
950
567
520
78
100
500
166
150
450
1833
927
1000
3000
1750
166
700

0
0
0
10
0
25
30
0
0
100
0
20
0
0
22
0
0
0
0
30
50
0
20
30
0
20
0
5
25
50
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1500
3000
5000
5000
4000
2000
1000
3000
5000
6000
2000
1800
3000
0
3000
345
1600
1000
500
5000
4000
2000
1200
5000
927
5000
8000
0
500
5000

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0
0
3
4
2
2
3
0
0
8
1
3
1
0
5
2
3
1
0
1
1
2
3
3
1
4
2
3
5
3

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

S. Kordofan
W. Kordofan
W. Kordofan
W. Kordofan
W. Kordofan
W. Kordofan
W. Kordofan
W. Kordofan

Kadugli
Lagawa
Lagawa
Lagawa
Lagawa
Lagawa
Lagawa
Lagawa

UM Suran
Nimir Shago
Raafo
Ras Al Fil
Saada
Safaria
Suelogi
Tima

30
100
0
133
490
367
6500
6000

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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2
50
0
1500
4000
2000
2000
7000

Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

ANNEX 2: UNMAS’ Scoring System for Assigning an “Impact-Based’ Priority Ranking System to
the Villages Surveyed in the SLIRI 64 Village Set
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Annex 4: Abbreviations
AP
AT
DCA
DDR
EOD
ERW
GPS
IDP
IRIN
IMSMA
JASMAR
JMC
LMA
MRE
NMAO
NPA
OSIL
SALW
SCBL
SLIRI
SLR
SOC
SPLA
SPLM
SRRC
UNDP
UNICEF
UNMAS
UNMIS
UXO

Anti-personnel (mines)
Anti-tank (mines)
DanChurchAid
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Explosive Remnants of War
Global Positioning System
Internally Displaced Person
Integrated Regional Information Network (humanitarian news agency)
Information Management System for Mine Action
Sudan Association for Combating Landmines (Government affiliated)
Joint Military Commission – peacekeeping force in the Nuba Mountains
Landmine Action
Mine Risk Education
(Government) National Mine Action Office
Norwegian People’s Aid
Operation Save Innocent Lives (SPLM affiliated)
Small Arms and Light Weapons
Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines
Sudan Landmines Information and Response Initiative
Sudan Landmines Response
Sector Operation Centres (SLIRI survey sites throughout the country
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Committee
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Mine Action Service
United Nations Mission in the Sudan
Unexploded Ordnance
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Annex 5: Contacts and Interviews
Landmine Action - UK
Richard Moyes
Simon Conway
Dan Ayliffe

Policy and Research Manager, Landmine Action, UK
Acting Director, Landmine Action, UK
Programme Manager, Sudan, Landmine Action, UK

Other International NGOs
James Murray
Mike Kendellen

Programme Manager, Comic Relief, UK
Director of Sudan Survey, Survey Action Centre, US

Government of Sudan
Hamid Ahmed Abdelaleem
Alfatah Ali Ismail
Abdul Munim Al Taib

Director, National Mine Action Office, Khartoum
Director, Humanitarian Affairs Commission and Sudan
Relief and Rehabilitation Committee, Kadugli
Wali/Governor, South Kordofan, Nuba Mountains

Landmine Action, Sudan
Patrick McLeish
Rae McGrath
Jez Lockett
David Elliott

Country Director, Landmine Action, Sudan
Previous Director, Landmine Action, UK and Sudan
Technical Advisor, Landmine Action, Sudan
Technical Advisor, Landmine Action, Sudan

Sudan Landmine Information Response Initiative
Mohamed Fawz Mohamed Programme Coordinator, SLIRI Sudan
Aziza Farah
Programme Monitor, SLIRI Sudan
Asha Babala Adam
Assistant Field Officer, SLIRI, Kadugli
Nadir Phillip Kadou
Field Officer, SLIRI, Kadugli
Simon Jundi
Previous Field Officer, SLIRI, Kadugli
United Nations
Jim Pansegrouw
Mohammed Kabir
Qadeem Khan Tariq
Sherif Baaser
Ahmed Gangari

CTA Program Manager, United Nations Mine Action
Office, Khartoum
Senior Data Management Advisor, United Nations Mine
Action Office, Khartoum
Senior Technical Advisor, Mine Action Service, United
Nations Development Program
Project Officer and Coordinator, Mine Risk Education,
United Nations Children Fund
Mine Risk Education Technical Advisor, United Nations
Children Fund
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Angus MacMillan
Jan Bosman
Boutros Obidka

Other
Bob Scott
Abdelati Abdelkheir Eid
Abo-Osama Abd Allah

Quality Assurance Officer, Nuba Region United Nations
Mine Action Office, Kadugli
Programme Manager, Nuba Region United Nations Mine
Action Office, Kadugli
Regional Coordinator, Mine Risk Education, United
Nations Mine Action Office

Programme Director, DanChurchAid, Um Sediba, Nuba
Mountains
Coordinator, Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines,
Khartoum
Executive Director, Sudanese Association for Combating
Landmines (JASMAR)
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